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I. Introduction
In 1980, shortly after Saddam Hussein assumed the Presidency of Iraq, that country attacked Iran in the southwest Khuzistan region. Iraq sought control over two major geographic goals: the Shattal-Arab channel, a shipping route for export of Iraqi oil; and the petroleum production facilities in Khuzistan, where more than 75% of Iran's oil resources were located. 1 In 1990, Iraq occupied Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia. If Iraq had been successful in these military actions, it would have controlled 40% of identified global reserves and 75% of Persian Gulf reserves (see Table 1 ).
In 1991, U.S. President George Bush supported a U.S.-led U.N. military coalition which defeated Iraq, emphasizing that, "Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world's great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein" (Yergin, 1991, p. 773) . This military action eliminated Iraq's potential to raise crude oil prices and attain quasi-monopoly profits. Yet five years earlier, then Vice-President Bush had flown to the Persian Gulf, meeting with Saudi government ministers and the King. The purpose of this 1986 trip had been to raise crude oil prices, which at the time were below $10 per barrel.
The purpose of our analysis is to illuminate part of the economic rationale for these superficially contradictory U.S. policies. We shall show the magnitude of the economic incentives for control of Persian Gulf oil, and also the logic which led the U.S. and some other OECD nations to work against 1 See Yergin (1991) and the International Petroleum Encyclopedia (1983). crude oil prices below $15 per barrel, and above $20 per barrel for a 13- Masters et al. (1994) . Table 1. year period from 1986 through 1999. The same incentives operate now to create a new, higher price range of potentially comparable stability.
The first section identifies the magnitude of economic rent (defined below) which partially motivates foreign policies of the Gulf countries and the U.S. It uses game theory logic to explain the $15-$20 per barrel range in which crude oil prices usually moved. The next section analyzes the framework now evolving toward a price range. The third part analyzes global military trade in the context of petroleum imports and exports. This is followed by a brief summary of the growth in nuclear weapons capability in the region. Then we summarize the pre-1980 history of Gulf production and international relations. We conclude with a discussion of future implications for the early part of this Century, and the likelihood of a near-term price range of $22 to $28 per barrel.
II. Petroleum Price, Rent, and Game Theory, 1986-1999
In the petroleum economics trade literature, $5 per barrel is widely used as the likely equilibrium price in a theoretically competitive world oil market working without production quota agreements (Adelman, 1986 and The Economist, 1999; Yergin, 1991) . Table 2 illustrates the production cost in a low-cost area in the Persian Gulf, and also for the North Sea. "Production cost" here means exploration, development, lifting, and shipping costs to an OECD consumer. It includes a normal return on investment ("profit"), and allowances for depletion and risk factors. However, for purposes of discussion, assume average Persian Gulf cost is $5 per barrel, and North Sea (and Alaskan) cost is $15 per barrel.
In other words, if the market price is $15 per barrel, a Persian Gulf producer earns "rent" Source: Chapman and Khanna (2000) and Chapman (1993) .
of $10 per barrel above the $5 per barrel production cost. At $25 per barrel, the rent is $20. With Gulf production typically 6 or 7 billion barrels per year, total economic rent above production cost was on the order of $120 billion annually in early 2000.
Mathematical techniques can be used in economic modeling to analyze the potential surplus or rent associated with use of the world's remaining oil resources. (Remaining resources are the sum of (a) identified reserves, and (b) geological estimates of undeveloped or unexplored petroleum resources).
Equation (1) shows the basic objective of a hypothetical monopolistic world oil industry:
Maximize, with respect to q t and
The logic is straightforward. NPV is the net present value of rent, the excess of revenue above cost.
The demand functions P(N,Y,q) shift upwards over time in response to rising global population (N) and per capita income (Y). Revenue is P*q, and cost is C. In the denominator, r represents the interest rate in calculating net present value. Remaining resources are S. The second line in the equation notes that future cumulative oil use cannot exceed remaining resources.
The goal, then, is to maximize NPV for producers by finding T, the optimal length of time for remaining production, and the best annual production levels q t . (For a full explanation of this mathematical technique applied to world oil, see Chapman and Khanna, 2000, and Chapman, 1993 2 .)
Of course the same method can be applied to an assumption of a competitive market. The results are summarized in Table 3 . In Table 3 We believe that economic, political, and military factors led both OECD consumers and OPEC producers to prefer the $15-20 per barrel range, as summarized in Table 4 . Consider U.S. net imports of petroleum, which have risen slowly and have passed the 50% level for total In these optimal control analyses, the problem is addressed with continuous rather than discrete functions. With the utilization of the shift in demand functions that is induced by growth in population and per capita income, the solutions show (a) in all cases, a long period of accelerating use followed by decline, (b) prices in the near term are stable, declining slightly, or increasing, depending upon near term assumptions about production cost trend and the exercise of market power as analyzed in the game theory discussion following, and (c) near term price trajectories are all followed by continuing price rise. • stable OECD oil production
• slow growth in oil consumption
• slow growth in import share
• stable prices
• continued Persian Gulf support
• stable revenue, profit, rent $30
• decline in GNP growth
• rapid near-term growth in domestic production
• stable or declining consumption • less production, more profit, rent
• greater payoff to successful Iraq-consumption. The U.S. production is costly; production cost in the Persian Gulf is not. Consequently, low crude oil prices increase U.S. dependence on imports in two ways. High cost U.S. production has to be shut down when crude prices are near $10 per barrel on a long-term basis. Second, U.S.
consumption of oil increases with lower prices. The end result is that crude prices in the $15 to $20 per barrel range avoided financial loss for American oil producers, slowed the decline in U.S. production levels, and encouraged U.S. political support for Persian Gulf governments threatened by Iraq or other forces seeking monopoly power over Persian Gulf oil.
3 Consider Japan's position in supporting the military defense of Kuwait by the U.S.-led operation. Japan imports essentially all of its petroleum. Three-fourths of its crude oil has originated in the Persian Gulf region (USEIA, 1994, p. 52). In the short run, it would benefit from a $5 to $10 per barrel world price. But, if Persian Gulf oil drives out U.S. and North Sea producers, the resulting monopoly-influenced price would increase significantly. With a long run perspective, Japan can depend upon stable prices and political stability for its supply, both supported by the U.S. (Yergin, 1991, pp. 759-760) . Table 4 lays out these and related points in a game theory framework. Both Persian Gulf and OECD governments were accustomed to the $15 to $20 per barrel price range. Either group acting alone could, for a short period, force prices in either direction. However, both groups had incentives to keep prices in this range. This is similar to the game theory concept of Nash Equilibrium: a status quo where neither side can improve its overall situation by changing its strategy. An initiative by either group acting alone, if opposed by the other side, leads to consequences which leave the initiator worse off than previously. A game theory approach is intended to represent the previously noted interaction of politics, military defense, and economics in world oil markets. This $15 to $20 per barrel level was far below a true monopoly price. It was also far above a truly competitive world price. The outcome in one narrow facet resembled a competitive market: world price was about at the level where it equaled the marginal cost of high cost producers.
In 1998, cash prices for Persian Gulf oil declined to $10 to $15 per barrel. The primary cause may have been a cessation of accelerated growth in petroleum consumption in Asia. Throughout most of that year, futures prices remained within the $15-$20 per barrel range. With the downward pressure on 1998 cash prices, the 1999 response could be anticipated which would raise crude oil prices.
III. 2000: Evolution to a Higher Price Band
As the year 2000 began, Jaffee and Manning reported in the policy journal Foreign Affairs their prediction of "The high probability of oil prices in the $12 to $20 range over most of the next two decades…." Their analysis was in sharp contrast to ours, published in this journal at the same time (Chapman and Khanna, 2000) . Notwithstanding the new and higher price range, the ability of Europe and North America to respond to high prices by increased production in Alaska and the North Sea is increasingly weakened.
Alaskan production is reduced by 50% from its 1988 peak (MER, 2000) . In the North Sea, increased production may be financially and physically feasible, but Norway's coordination with OPEC reduces the competitive power of this option.
Within the international oil industry, the acquisition of Mobil, Amoco, ARCO, and Standard of Ohio by Exxon and British Petroleum has eliminated the potential competitive influence of four previously independent major global oil companies. Exxon, BP, and Royal Dutch Shell are no longer in an adversarial position with Persian Gulf countries with respect to price.
BP, because of its dominant position in Alaska and its major positions in the North Sea and the
Persian Gulf, is particularly well placed to benefit from and implement new pricing arrangements.
As noted, Norway does not see itself as a price competitor. Mexico as well as Norway is now coordinating production planning with Persian Gulf and OPEC countries.
On the demand side, continued growth in U.S. petroleum consumption and the resumption of growth in Asian consumption has resumed the pattern of continuously rising demand curves. Each year, at any given price, more petroleum will be consumed than previously.
Taken together, these six factors (inflation, the decline in Alaskan and U.S. output, the stabilization of North Sea production, Norway and Mexico coordination with OPEC, consolidation among major oil companies, and the resumption of upwardly shifting demand curves) combine to create a new calculus. 5 The game theory framework is still intact, but the new price range has been articulated as $22 to $28 (in current dollars), rather than the prior $15 to $20 range.
It is too early in the evolution of this new stage to be confident. Nevertheless, we speculate that target prices will continue to define OPEC/PG-OECD policy in the near future. The price-per-barrel values in Table 4 should be redefined accordingly. The duration of the new $22 to $28 target price range is uncertain. However, the game theory logic continues intact beyond the demise of the old 1986-1999 price range.
IV. Arms Trade and the Oil Economy
The economic incentive underlying military activity in the Persian Gulf has been established in the previous sections. Here we examine the global arms trade in the context of the oil economy and determine the empirical significance of a few key nations in this context.
Based on a comprehensive global data set, Table 5 determines a fairly close empirical relationship between world trade in conventional weapons and the trade in crude oil and refined petroleum products: arms exports (imports) are highly correlated with oil imports (exports).
Exploring this relationship are a pair of regression models based on a cross section of 121 countries for 1995. The regression coefficients have the expected sign given the results in Table 5 .
Arms variables are measured in million dollars whereas the oil variables are in billion dollars. Thus, according to these regression results, a $1 billion increase in total oil imports yields a $0.16 billion increase in the exports of conventional weapons, on average. Similarly, a $1 billion increase in the total volume of oil exports results, on average, in a $0.11 billion increase in the value of arms imports. It is interesting that in both models variables measuring the size and overall economic health of the economy, namely GNP and GNP per capita, were found to be insignificant explanatory variables. 6 6 In the regression Equations (2) and (3), ARMEXP and ARMIMP are arms exports and imports. TOILIMP and TOILEXP are total imports and exports, and ε represents error terms. The sources for these data are the same as those in Table 5 . The figures in parenthesis are the heteroscedasticity consistent t-ratios based on White's heteroscedasticity consistent standard error estimates. See Greene (1997) for details. As expected, no evidence of autocorrelation was found. The regression slope coefficients are significant at the 5% level in both models. To identify the key countries in this context, consider Table 6 , which provides details on the value of arms transfers between the major supplier and recipient countries. It is clear from this table that more than 50% of the global exports of conventional arms between 1994 and 1996 originated in the United States, followed by the United Kingdom at a distant second. Saudi Arabia was the single largest recipient of these weapons, receiving almost three as times as high a value of arms imports as the next highest recipient, Egypt. Other countries in the Persian Gulf region, particularly Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, are also significant importers of conventional weapons, each receiving approximately $800-$1000 million per year.
7
Drawing together the statistics on arms trade presented above, the crude oil reserves data in Table 1 , and country specific details on the imports and exports of crude oil and refined petroleum products (USEIA 1998), we can identify the key countries in the international oil- Source: ACDA, 1998. Table III. also the largest oil importers, whereas the countries with the largest remaining and identified crude oil resources are the largest recipients of these arms.
V. Instability, Local Conflict, and Nuclear Weapons
The Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia are usually considered distinct regions.
However, a broader network of national tensions overlays the Persian Gulf region. Five of the world's nuclear-capable countries have borders within 1600 miles of the Straits of Hormuz. 8 In all cases, existing missile range capability makes nuclear aggression in the Persian Gulf region a technically feasible option (see Table 7 ). The other two nuclear capable regions, the United States and the European Community, are both major importers of Persian Gulf oil. Figure 2 shows countries with nuclear warheads and their oil production. The apparent association is spurious, in the sense that crude oil production does not cause nuclear capability. There are at least seven sets of national rivalries that have involved nuclear-capable countries.
9
The simplest interpretation of the Figure is that most of the conflicts associated with nuclear-capable countries have the potential of affecting the Persian Gulf.
Pakistan, though not a major oil producer, borders the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. A nuclear conflict involving India and Pakistan would probably impact Persian Gulf shipping and perhaps production. A Pakistan strategy might potentially involve the threat of Both companies worked to provide a secure supply of petroleum for the United Kingdom during the earlier decades of the century. As was typical, British companies simply assumed the responsibilities of government in their concessions in Iran's oil regions: customs, police, taxation, telegraph, education, and banking (Upton, 1961; Chapman, 1983) . Russia, on the other hand, sought, rather unsuccessfully, to promote Soviet republics in Northern Iran. From 1953 to 1978, Iran's policies were coordinated with U.S. interests, as is well known (e.g., Yergin, 1991; Roosevelt, 1979 (ARAMCO, 1960; Yergin, 1991) .
While the companies no longer exert such control, the relations between the Saudi and the U.S.
10 It has been asserted that sources in Saudi Arabia and Iran support Muslim military operations in Kashmir (National Geographic, 1999) . government remain strong, as discussed above.
Each Persian Gulf country has an analogous individual history that fits into the larger mosaic of oil production and historical relations with European and U.S. companies and governments.
VII. Summary: Implications for International Policy
Historically, Europe, the United States, and Russia have sought to secure access to Persian Gulf oil. Its low cost and high volume of remaining resources continue to place the Gulf at the center of petroleum geopolitics. The magnitude of economic rent above cost is on the order of $15-20 trillion.
Military power has played a significant role in policy. Iraq, in its invasions of Iran and Kuwait and its threat to Saudi Arabia, has sought control over one-half of the world's remaining oil resources.
The U.N. alliance, led by the United States, eliminated Iraq's military power, and continues to control Iraq's military capabilities as well as its oil sales.
Thus far, international policy in the Gulf is the result of diplomacy, military action, and economic relations, setting the $15-20 per barrel price range outlined above during the last 13 years of the last Century and creating a higher target price range in 2000.
Production from Alaska and the North Sea continues to decline while world consumption grows. Mexico and Norway have initiated effective coordination with Saudi Arabia and OPEC (NYT, 1999) . The ability of OECD producers to increase production to force lower prices is lessened. In addition, consolidation among major petroleum companies has reduced the competitive potential of the industry.
In combination with the resumption of upwardly shifting global demand functions and inflation, raise the target price range to $22-$28 per barrel.
In the late 1990s, weapons trade became closely associated with petroleum trade, as analyzed above. As nuclear weapons capabilities slowly spread, an unexpected byproduct of national rivalries has been the creation of a geographic pattern in which five of the nuclear powers are within 1600 miles of the Straits of Hormuz. The other nuclear powers are major consumers of Persian Gulf oil. Iraq would probably have nuclear warheads today if not for the U.N./U.S. control over its military resources.
We do not suppose that we can suggest or advocate practical new policies to stabilize politics, prices, and production. We hope this analysis delineates some of the economic and security motivation for more explicit international policies in this context.
